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ABSTRACT
Observers who note the increasing popularity of bioethics discussions often
complain that the social sciences are poorly represented in discussions
about things like abortion and stem-cell research. Critics say that bioethicists should be incorporating the methods and findings of social scientists,
and should move towards making the discipline more empirically oriented.
This way, critics argue, bioethics will remain relevant, and truly reflect the
needs of actual people. Such recommendations ignore the diversity of
viewpoints in bioethics, however. Bioethics can gain much from the
methods and findings from ethnographies and similar research. But it is
misleading to suggest that bioethicists are unaware of this potential benefit.
Not only that, bioethicists are justified in having doubts about the utility of
the social science approach in some cases. This is not because there is
some inherent superiority in non-empirical approaches to moral argument.
Rather, the doubts concern the nature of the facts that the sciences would
provide. Perhaps the larger point is that disagreements about the relationship between facts and normative arguments should be seen as part of the
normal inquiry in bioethics, not evidence that reform is needed.

I. THE CASE AGAINST BIOETHICS
As the field of bioethics has grown, a cottage industry of
sceptics has kept pace with it.1 While critics have always
come at bioethics from different perspectives, some of the
more vocal have recently argued from a vantage point in
the social-sciences. As Socrates used to advise against
listening to self-proclaimed experts on virtue, these

gadflies warn that, as things stand, ‘bioethicists cannot
demonstrate that given ethical pronouncements are more
valid (what would that mean after all?) than the moral
experiences of the layperson’2 Another sceptic warns
readers and public officials not to be misled by bioethicists, since it is the people who grapple with decisions
about their own healthcare who are the ‘genuine applied
philosophers, working through a moral dilemma, using

1

Some early critiques of the field are discussed in Gorovitz S. Baiting
bioethics. Ethics 1986; 96: 356–374. I will concentrate my attention,
however, on only three or four more recent critics who best illustrate the
case against bioethics methodology.

2

A. Kleinman. Moral Experience and Ethical Reflection: Can Ethnography Reconcile Them? A Quandary for the ‘New Bioethics’. Daedulus
1999; 128: 69–97, p. 84.
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values and beliefs about morality to reach a decision that
they then have to put into practice’.3
The message that emerges from broadsides like these is
that much more is at stake than academic braggingrights. As one critic explains:
the justificatory apparatus of traditional bioethics:
(1) assumes that real-life moral problems come sorted,
labeled, and ready for the manipulation of rules, principles, and theories, (2) disregards the extent to which
moral concepts and norms derive their meaning and
their force from the social and cultural surroundings in
which they are embedded; (3) neglects the ways in
which moral problems are generated and framed by
the practices, structures, and institutions within which
they arise; and (4) ignores the means by which social
and cultural ideologies, and the power relationships
they entrench, can both perpetuate moral inertia and
effect moral change.4
Critics of bioethics insist that commentators owe it to the
people their arguments might affect to recognize their
shortcomings and reform the discipline. Bioethicists are
increasingly being asked to help resolve issues of profound significance, and reform is said to be overdue. To
that end, self-interest is mentioned as though it too might
spur some bioethicists towards reform. If bioethicists
ignore the critics’ advice, the long-term prospects for the
discipline are supposed to be bleak.
Hoffmaster speaks of ‘the almost indiscriminate way in
which the rubric of morality is now being used. . . .’5
Along similar lines, another sceptic contends that ‘to a
large extent, the legitimacy of bioethics derives from its
social power to define problems as “ethical” (and not
structural) and solve them “ethically” (and not necessarily equitably)’.6 Fulford insists that ‘bioethics may be, not
merely question begging, nor even just impractical, but
actually counterproductive’. For him, the discipline ‘has
reached the point of diminishing returns’.7 Bioethicists,
he thinks, can’t see that their ‘philosophical project
of generating moral knowledge ultimately displaces
3

A.M. Hedgecoe. Critical Bioethics: Beyond the Social Science
Critique of Applied Ethics. Bioethics 2004; 18: 120–43, p. 137, see also
121.
4
B. Hoffmaster. Introduction. In: Hoffmaster B, ed. Bioethics in Social
Context. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001; 1–11, p. 2–3.
5
B. Hoffmaster. Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics? .
Social Science & Medicine 1992; 35: 1421–1431, p. 1424.
6
Lopez, J. ( 2000). ‘How sociology can save bioethics . . . maybe.’ Sociology of Health & Illness 26(7): 875–896, p. 882.
7
B. Fulford. The Paradoxes of Confidentiality. In: Cordress C, ed.
Confidentiality and Mental Health. London: J. Kingsley Publishers,
2001; 7–23, p. 11.

morality from the experience in which it is grounded’.8
Lastly, Hedgecoe predicts that ‘bioethicists . . . run the
risk of being cut out of the policy-making loop, and being
isolated from the kinds of decisions that bioethics has
always aspired to influence’ (p. 142).
The good news, if there is any, is that bioethicists who
want to stay in the loop have only to reach out to those
with expertise in the empirical approach, since ‘the kinds
of answers required by policy makers are the kinds of
things that social scientists are better at providing’.9
Judging from their arguments, it is never clear whether
critics are of one mind concerning what reform would
actually involve. Would bioethics become a social
science, would critics be satisfied with more integration of
empirical methods, or do we merely need a greater reliance on empirical details in bioethics commentary? What
does seem clear from the gist of the criticism is that bioethicists have been too slow, or simply unwilling, to adapt
their arguments to what is vaguely described as the social
science perspective. Critics complain of an indoctrination
that lulls bioethicists into thinking that they need no help
from empirical researchers.10 Their own resistance to
change is said to keep bioethicists ‘yoked to the abstraction of reason and theory’.11 Once they conform to the
ideology of bioethics, commentators think only in
narrow, predictable patterns. From a ‘sociologist and
seasoned bioethics-watcher’ we learn that:
despite attempts to break through the domination of
the field by the abstract principlism of analytic philosophy, and to incorporate other philosophical systems
into the matrix of bioethical thought, relatively little
change has occurred in the contours, context, style of
thought, or the ideology of bioethics.12
The tone of impatience is thus explained by the fact that
too often the ‘response to criticism from the social sciences is either indifference or over-defensive irritation’.13
Some of the critics even tell of rejection that goes beyond
polite silence, as they describe the hurt they felt upon
being denied admission to meetings of bioethicists.14
8
B. Hoffmaster. Introduction. In: Hoffmaster B, ed. Bioethics in
Social Context. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001; 1–11, p.
1424.
9
Hedgecoe, 2004, p. 142.
10
R.C. Fox & J. Swazey. Medical Morality is not Bioethics. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 1984; 27: 337–360.
11
B. Hoffmaster. Introduction. In: Hoffmaster B, ed. Bioethics in
Social Context. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001; 1–11, p. 1.
12
Fox, 1999, as cited in Hedgecoe, p. 123.
13
Hedgecoe 2004, p. 121.
14
See, e.g. R. DeVries, J. Subedi. Preface. In: DeVries R, Subedi J, eds.
Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise. Upper Saddle
River, NJ Prentice-Hall, 1998; 11–19.
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This is said to be unfortunate, because reform could
lead to a bioethics that ‘incorporates social science
research into philosophical thinking,’ and is ‘rooted in
empirical research’ (Hedgecoe, 2004, p. 135). Hoffmaster
thinks that the social sciences could ‘save the life of
medical ethics’.15 Hedgecoe observes that ‘a bioethicist’s
credibility depends to some extent’ on a convincing portrayal of the details in the situation (Hedgecoe 2004,
133).16 He is especially troubled by ‘empirically testable
statements that philosophers make about ethics’, statements which he thinks are ‘disputable’ but are nonetheless ‘presented as fact’ (p. 131).17 Zussman notes that
‘a good deal of medical ethics is based on consequentialist claims that social scientists are well equipped to
assess . . .’18 He does not hide his disappointment when he
says that ‘medical ethicists rarely mount those tests themselves, [and] social scientists, whether using ethnographic
methods, reviews of records, or survey instruments, can
test those claims’ (p. 10). And Hedgecoe’s advice to
policy-makers is that ‘if they are interested in the ethics of
a particular technology, their first port of call should be
the social science literature about that technology, rather
than the standard bioethics debates’ (p. 136).

II. WHICH BIOETHICS?
How seriously bioethicists should take these warnings
depends on what degree of coherence one gives the
particular allegations. Were readers to rely solely on the
criticisms of the discipline, they could be forgiven for
thinking that working relationships between bioethicists
and social scientists are rare. While I won’t elect myself
15

B. Hoffmaster. Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics?.
Social Science & Medicine 1992; 35: 1421–1431.
16
Even bioethicists who incline towards media exposure are often criticized by their fellow scholars for not being sufficiently grounded in what
the social scientists call the ‘local world,’ a claim that would support.
See, for instance, J. Rachels. When Philosophers Shoot from the Hip.
Bioethics 1991; 5: 67–71.
17
Citing the popular Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Hedgecoe scolds
the authors for claiming that their theory ‘conforms to the way that
virtually all persons learn to think morally’ (Beauchamp & Childress, as
cited in Hedgecoe, p. 131). Hedgecoe takes issue with this ‘relaxed use of
empirical claims’ (p. 132), adding that ‘at the core of the social sciences
is a commitment to root one’s ideas in social reality, which it is not
necessarily the case with philosophy’ (p. 132). While Hedgecoe is probably making too much of one sentence (from a book of some 400 pages)
when he claims that it constitutes proof of a problematic ‘institutional
attitude of bioethics towards the social sciences as a whole’ (p. 132), the
position he takes on the solution that the social science represents is
consistent with that of other critics.
18
R. Zussman. The contributions of sociology to medical ethics. Hastings Center Report 2000; 30: 7–11.
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spokesman for the discipline, my experience indicates
that the multi-disciplinary nature of bioethics is, if anything, taken for granted by those working in the field.
As graduate students, aspiring bioethicists become
accustomed to hearing that they can improve their game
by paying closer attention to care ethics, virtue ethics,
post-modernist thinking, feminism, classic literature,
ancient Greek values, and the like. There is every
reason to believe that bioethics is or could be informed
through close collaboration with these disciplines or
orientations, and one might list others that could
play an equally important role, such as history and
hermeneutics.
What is hard to understand is why the critics of bioethics think that this type of collaboration isn’t taking
place. One could cite as additional signs of disciplinary
integration the degree programs that introduce students
to the abstract, philosophical side of the discipline as well
as the basics of fieldwork and social policy. There are also
the bioethicists who obtain degrees like the Masters in
Public Health, which merges disciplines previously associated with medicine and social science, and adds a strong
component of ethics and public activism. Critics maintain
that a preoccupation with disciplinary borders hurts the
projects and the application of methods in bioethics. Yet
a scan of the literature and the working arrangements in
the field suggests that the type of inter-disciplinary relationships that critics want to see have formed some time
ago.
It is worth noting that the dialogue of disciplines probably does not occur because bioethicists seek intellectual
pluralism for its own sake. The problems that bioethicists
have historically chosen to address require a wide range
of approaches, and diversity of mind and method is necessary if commentators are to make sense of controversies
that touch on law, science, medicine, social policy, and of
course religion and ethics. Just as no bioethicist that I am
aware of would pretend that the last word has been
spoken on abortion or factory farming, opinions are necessarily evolving concerning how the field can best meet
the needs of its practitioners and those who are touched
by their judgments. For now, however, it seems that bioethicists who do not anchor their commentary in the real
world are going to have very little to discuss. Bioethicists
who choose not to reach out to fields such as law or
biology are going to have very little to add to this
dialogue.
One surprising thing about the appeal for reform is
that, for all of the talk of an anti-empiricist mindset,
critics provide no citations of bioethicists who openly
dismiss the social-sciences. This is particularly odd
because opinions that individual bioethicists hold about
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the legitimacy of the empirical approach are potentially
as varied as the theoretical perspectives that the scholars
employ. We should thus expect variation along geographical, political, and cultural lines when it comes to
the perceived standing that the social sciences ought to
have in bioethics. Accordingly, we could probably find a
bioethicist working in Boston who claims to take a dim
view towards the social sciences, and one in Wales who is
equally opposed, without being sure that both are really
thinking of the same entity or have the same idea of
‘social science’. It would therefore be a mistake to think,
lacking any real evidence to support the claim, that both
bioethicists would share views about the ideal relationship between their discipline and the social sciences. That
relationship has not developed along parallel lines across
cultures or geographic regions, and some problems in
bioethics clearly admit to more of an empirical approach
than others.
Generalizations about where bioethics fails to measure
up can’t help but sound naive when set against the fact
that values and approaches that dominate the commentary in one area, such as the Far East, do not always
mirror those that receive the most attention in another
area, like the UK or North America. Even within North
America, for example, there are shades of difference
between commentary that originates in the USA and
Canada. Supposing that the critics were to focus on one
geographic area, such as Europe, there we would probably still find scholars who accept the bioethicist label yet
align themselves with radically different perspectives,
some of which are more empirically oriented than others.
On that basis, critics are stating the obvious if they mean
to say that some bioethicists could do more to cite or
contribute to the academic journals devoted to the sociology of medicine, social science and healthcare, and
medical anthropology (to name a few of the hybrid
fields). The trouble is that greater utilization of those
journals or the empirical orientation in general is surely
not the way to improve upon each and every discussion in
bioethics.
This is one of the puzzling aspects of the criticism: the
harshest judgments seem directed against clinical or
medical ethicists, without any regard for the way that
such categories can spill-over into other areas of bioethics. Certainly, some of the loudest, and most influential,
voices heard in bioethics emerge from commentators who
take their ideas to the mass-media, and who weigh-in on
each medical controversy that develops. But if such commentators are what has critics bothered, this should be all
the more convenient, as they hardly shy away from criticism. As it happens, of course, many bioethics scholars
work out of the way of the media, in a wide range of

academic departments, including those affiliated with the
social sciences. There are bioethicists who devote their
efforts to the refinement of the moral language and
concepts (something that is surely useful for crossdisciplinary projects with social scientists). Those same
bioethicists might study issues like animal welfare and
the environment, in addition to their work on more
healthcare-related issues like the doctor-patient relationship or the readability of drug information. Are they too
facing irrelevance?
Critics like Hedgecoe issue sweeping charges, that, for
instance, ‘an assumption of traditional bioethics is that
by thinking hard in a special way, one can abstract one’s
mental faculties from this context and make pure, rational ethical decisions’ (p. 138). This is not easy to take
seriously because Hedgecoe does not identify specific
authors or explain which ‘traditional bioethics’ is in question. His critique contains no evidence, indirect or otherwise, that bioethicists contributing to the literature truly
believe in such things as ‘pure, rational ethical decisions’.
I confess that I have no idea what Hedgecoe means, since
my experience suggests that bioethicists are more in the
habit of thinking that ethical problems are quite messy
and are rarely if ever solved on wholly rational grounds.
I get the same sense of unfamiliarity when reading
Hoffmaster’s generalizations about bioethics. He argues
that bioethicists are drawn to methods that rely on
abstract theories and principles because they ‘assume that
real-life moral problems come sorted, labeled, and ready
for the manipulation of rules.’19 Dramatic as this sounds,
there is no evidence that someone working in the field
actually assumes what Hoffmaster alleges, that moral
problems come pre-packaged. As for claims that bioethicists rely too much on conceptual analysis and put too
much faith in ‘principles,’ these I am familiar with. But
that is only because such criticisms have been made so
often in the bioethics literature. Where there is no apparent effort to connect the criticisms to specific debates in
that literature, such generalizations do no justice to the
variety of traditions and philosophical orientations that
one finds in bioethics.20 In simple terms, not every bioethicist can be a principlist, and even if all of those who are
tend to be wrong, this would seem to make it that much
easier to identify their errors so that they might be
avoided in future commentary.
19
See Hoffmaster, 2001, p. 1. This is a common charge, though not
everyone locates the source of the problem in a lack of familiarity with
social science or its methods. See, e.g., C. Elliott, Where ethics comes
from and what to do about it. Hastings Center Report, 22(4): 28–35,
1992.
20
M.A. DeWachter. Sociology and Bioethics in the U.S.A. Hastings
Center Report 1998; 28: 40–42.
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There are in bioethics, as in any field, dubious trends
and misplaced loyalty to schools of thought. But on this
point as well, what is new in the criticisms is not very
useful, and seems geared towards a discipline that
few bioethicists would recognize or bother defending.
The differences between the individual positions that
commentators take are more subtle than critics let on. A
close look at the literature would reveal to critics that
arguments based on what seem to be very similar
methods can culminate in differences of opinion depending on the issues involved.21 Principlists who at first look
to be united in their beliefs can often disagree, even over
the proper application of principlism. Scrutiny of principlism, sometimes shrill, has also been in the mainstream
of bioethics almost since the emergence of that model of
reasoning.22 The analytical approach also lends itself to
various styles, and different levels of sympathy for the
social sciences. And like principlism, the analytical
approach has been subject to recurring critique from
within philosophy.23 This means that critics interested in
picking a fight with bioethicists who employ certain
methods will have to be quite specific. They will also have
to get in line, behind others who are already taking issue
with bioethics methods.

III. ARE BIOETHICISTS WRONG ABOUT
FACTS AND VALUES?
The critic might respond that little attention is given to
specific arguments or commentators because the goal is
to change fundamental assumptions within bioethics, not
to shame individual bioethicists into reforming. For
critics, a more appropriate target would be the conventional wisdom, that ‘truths in almost any field are established by a combination of evidence and argument. The
evidence is primarily empirical in one way or another, but
it is the argument about the meaning of the evidence, and
the conclusions which it licenses, that make the ethical
contribution’. Such thinking might to critics unjustly
privilege the normative over the empirical, with social
science methods being forced to take a backseat.24 In a
reformed bioethics, critics seem to say, commentators
will be able to describe the features of moral situation
with sufficient insight and detail that the usual logic and
analysis will only get in the way.
21
J. Evans. A Sociological Account of the Growth of Principlism.
Hastings Center Report 2000; 30: 31–38.
22
K.D. Clouser & B. Gert. A critique of principlism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1990; 15: 219–236.
23
B. Almond. Seeking wisdom. Philosophy 1997; 72: 417–433.
24
J. Harris. The Scope and Importance of Bioethics. In: Harris J, ed.
Bioethics. NY: Oxford University Press, 2001; 1–22, p. 13.
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This is an appealing view, that bioethicists who give up
their methodological assumptions can learn to see in
ordinary situations what the social scientists have been
recognizing all along. It is a view that Hedgecoe takes up
when he warns that ‘because of this refusal to come to
terms with empirical research in the way in which ethical
decision making actually takes place in the clinic, bioethics faces a difficult gap that must be bridged if it is to
remain a relevant and serious discipline’ (2004, p. 126).
Hedgecoe alleges that the famous ‘is-ought’ distinction
can distort the perception that bioethicists have towards
various issues. He contends that ‘social scientists have
presented detailed research disputing the descriptive/
normative division’ (Hedgecoe 2004, 131).25 The separation between descriptive fact and moral value is, we learn,
a ‘figment of philosophical imagination’ (131).
Critics also say that a preoccupation with logical
analysis leads to a ‘discrepancy between theory and practice’, with bioethicists being able to talk only to each
other and in a technical language that is far removed
from the conversations that patients might want to take
part in.26 As a result, there is a ‘significant difference
between ethics as presented in bioethics and the way in
which ethical reasoning takes place in the clinic, as shown
by an increasing number of sociological and anthropological studies’ (Hedgecoe p. 121). According to one of
the most common allegations, the problem arises because
bioethicists pay insufficient attention to context. After
explaining that the advantage in ‘ethnographic work’ is
that it ‘reveals that morality must be understood contextually,’ Hoffmaster reminds bioethicists that ‘reading
books and engaging in arm-chair speculation, does not
supply contexts. Contexts in which moral problems arise
can be appreciated only by becoming immersed in clinical
settings, as ethnographers do’ (1992, 1427).27 Haimes promotes the ethnographic approach by suggesting that ‘if
we are to understand more clearly how individuals “act
ethically”, we have to engage in the detailed, contextualized dilemmas’.28 For his part, Kleinman tells us of the
ethnographer’s skill in understanding ‘how reality is
made over in different institutional contexts through
history and micropolitics’ (1999, 79).

25
Borry, et al. (2005) delve further than I will into the fact-value distinction as it relates to the social-science criticism of bioethics. Borry, P.;
Schotsmans, P.; and Dierickx, K. The Birth of the Empirical Turn in
Bioethics. Bioethics, 19(1): 49–71, 2005.
26
B. Hoffmaster. Introduction. In: Hoffmaster B, ed. Bioethics in
Social Context. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001; 1–11, p. 9.
27
Hoffmaster 1992, p. 1425.
28
E. Haimes. What can the social sciences contribute to the study of
ethics? Bioethics 2002; 16: 90–113, p. 105.
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When they turn to listing the assumptions that bioethicists would be better off without, however, critics don’t
make a strong case. In his discussion of the is-ought
distinction, Hedgecoe cites only a footnote in an ethnography about how parents make medical decisions.29 In
that ethnography there is no discussion of whether we
ought to derive an evaluative conclusion from factual
premises. Tracking down that footnote leads only to
other ethnographies (such as Kaufman 1997), one of
them about physicians, and another (Lock 1998) on the
way that Japanese mothers view parenting.30 This makes
for weak evidence that a fundamental distinction exists
only in the minds of bioethicists. It is also unfortunate
that Hedgecoe does not consider the distinction that
social scientists make between facts and values in their
traditional separation between qualitative and quantitative branches in sociology or fieldwork.
When they turn to explaining what bioethicists should
replace their methodological assumptions with, critics
also tend to stall or lapse into speculation. Critics seem to
agree that ethnography holds great promise as a resource
for the testing of bioethics claims. But as an appeal for
reform, this doesn’t go very far. There are different
strains of ethnographic practice, and it would be misleading to imply that the answer to questions about what
bioethics commentary is lacking is as simple as ethnography or context. Just as it is no easy task to show why one
paper in a bioethics journal is more ‘analytical’ than
another, saying that an entire range of commentary in
bioethics could be improved through ethnography or
with more stress on empirical detail is leaving a lot
unsaid. The suggestion that context will produce better
arguments might also puzzle the bioethicists who are
sometimes accused of being relativists as it is, as they are
said to place too much weight on such details now.31
Setting this aside, shouldn’t it be possible to show
where bioethicists are overlooking what context might do
for them? Haimes (2002) thinks so, and looks specifically
at discussions on informed consent. She finds that bioethicists could learn much from ethnographers, and that
the commentary on informed consent is not geared to the
29

Alderson 1990.
Kaufman, S.R. Construction and Practice of Medical Responsibility:
Dilemmas and Narratives from Geriatrics. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 21: 1–26, 1997. Lock, M. Perfecting Society: Reproductive
Technologies, Genetic Testing, and the Planned Family in Japan. In
Pragmatic Women and Body Politics, pp. 206–239. Edited by Lock, M.,
and Kaufert, P.A., 206–239, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1998.
31
Cf. T.L. Beauchamp. A Defense of the Common Morality. Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 2003; 13: 259–274; and R. Macklin. Ethical
Relativism in a Multicultural Society. Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal 1998; 8: 1–22.
30

needs of actual patients.32 Focusing primarily on studies
of patients who were considering the use of reproductive
technologies, Haimes found that the women confronted
tough questions about personhood, leading her to
wonder why ‘philosophers [and not social scientists] are
invited in to explain the different forms that answers to
such questions might take’. Haimes alleges that, ‘whilst
there is a place for abstract principles, there is also a place
for the social sciences to throw further light both on the
questions themselves and on the contexts in which they
arise’ (2002, 100).
Not mentioned, however, is the possibility that there
aren’t many bioethicists who would dispute such a claim.
That is, Haimes might have done more to validate the use
of context if she had presented evidence that bioethicists
think that an application of principlism leaves no
room for context or that the understanding of informed
consent begins and ends with principlism. Equally important, granting that context is important if we want to
understand, informed consent does not make it any easier
to say which aspects or interpretations of context will
actually help a bioethics argument. Haimes reports that
‘some women blurred the boundaries between chemical
pregnancies, embryos, and actual babies. As one woman
said at the point of embryo replacement, ‘well, they are
my babies “cos they are my embryos” ’. (Haimes, 100).
Haimes takes this passage to show that ‘we have here
a highly contextualized definition of what is a person:
one that is given meaning and consequently acted upon’
(2002, 100). But others might not see this as an obvious
counter-example to ‘abstract principlism’ or anything
else common in bioethics discussions.
Haimes argues that what she discerns upon reading an
account of the patient’s experience is somehow contradicted by or antithetical to recommendations that bioethicists might make. This all comes off a bit too easily, since
we could interpret the woman Haimes describes to be
adopting some form of principle-based reasoning herself.
And were we to do that, the challenge would once more be
to see that the right principles are receiving the proper
attention and that the right details are being included in
our interpretation. This is only one possible interpretation, but that is the point: Haimes’s attempt to show where
32
The comparison of methods needn’t be held to a scientific standard to
make the point. But such a comparison could be made scientific, as it
might be possible to survey those with a stake in the future of bioethics
(e.g. scholars, patients, healthcare workers) and let them decide which
discussions are most plausible. A skeptic might say that this is already
done, to some extent, by way of peer-review in the bioethics literature,
but peer-review leaves open the system of validation that critics distrust,
so it could serve as one ‘arm’ of such a study, but never the final source
of judgment.
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a comment by a patient is illustrative of a deficiency in the
literature depends on a very narrow interpretation of both.
From what we are given, the evidence that would support
the charge that bioethicists are intellectually distant from
the people they write about is no stronger than the evidence that ethnographers have special insight into the
needs and interests of those people.
To see why, consider again the survey of the literature
that Haimes reports on. She contends that the patient in
the situation she read about was providing a ‘highly contextualized definition’ of personhood. What reason is
there to accept this interpretation? Would the patient
agree that this is what her utterance represents? With no
real support for the interpretation, it would be irresponsible to take the slice of context that Haimes provides as
proof of the defects in theories of personhood and
informed consent. Additionally, if Haimes thinks that
bioethicists have failed to provide a suitable working
definition of personhood for such situations, she still
must offer an argument for looking to this specific
patient for that. A bioethicist who simply assumed that
the reasoning that prevails in the clinic can be taken as
the standard would be making the field less relevant, not
more so.
In her next exhibit of the flaws in the bioethics literature, Haimes cites a study where researchers witnessed a
‘vast range of practical and emotional problems associated with multiple births. The practical problems,’ she
explains:
included not being able to pick up all babies at one
time, coping with different sleeping patterns amongst
the children, isolation because of the difficulties of
taking three or more small babies out at any one time,
financial difficulties. . . . and the lack of formal assistance in raising the children (Haimes, 2002, 101).
Haimes contends that this study:
point[s] to questions about what counts as informed
consent. Should information include the consequences
of going through the treatment process itself? Should
information include detailed consideration about
whether a multiple birth is actually something parents
have seriously considered and know that they can cope
with? The social science research described here suggests that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’ (2002,
102).
But is the suggestion here that bioethicists are not in
the habit of asking ‘what counts as informed consent’? It
is hard to avoid the impression that bioethicists and
would-be reformers are not as far apart in their opinions
about what informed consent should involve. Few bioet-
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hicists might question the complexity of moral situations,
so Haimes does not sufficiently make the point that a
bioethicist and what could be called a ‘contextualist’ necessarily achieve different results. Haimes could be right
that bioethicists do not pay enough attention to whether
patients consider it tougher to carry two babies rather
than one. Still, this places the burden on Haimes to give
some account of why a theory of informed consent would
rule out this type of personalized consideration.
In a similar attempt to show where discussions of
informed consent go wrong, Kleinman argues that
‘ethics, once framed as models of moral reasoning, championing the reflection and rational choice of autonomous
individuals in quest of objective standards, risk irrelevance to the almost always uncertain circumstances and
highly contextualized conditions of human experience’
(1999, 72). This fits with the general charge that the kind
of information ethnographers can uncover in patient narratives is ‘usually hidden from most bioethicists’ gaze
since [it] lie[s] within the communities and families rather
than within the more visible context of the clinic’
(Haimes, 2002, 102). To avoid irrelevance, Kleinman
would have bioethicists who discuss informed consent
address the ‘person as part of a network of relations,
memories, current pressures, and uncertain prospects,
and constrained by interconnections and shared fate’
(1999, 71). This is because, Kleinman explains, there is
little value in discussions of informed consent that are
dominated by the ‘primal and somewhat atomistic scene
favored by analytic philosophers’ (1999, 71).
Here too, more useful than vague references to the
shortcomings of analytic methods would be some evidence that specific bioethicists are prone to miss something of relevance when they study informed consent.
That some bioethicists do not delve very deeply into the
empirical side of moral problems is beyond dispute; but
the more pressing issue is how to determine which degree
of context will illuminate our thinking about a particular
patient’s needs. That issue receives no mention in
Kleinman’s selective look at informed consent commentary. It is one thing to urge that bioethicists take ‘shared
fate’ into consideration when they argue on behalf of
patients or families, and another to say why this would
lead to better moral arguments. My hunch is that if
Kleinman had explained what shared fate involves, we
would find that consideration of its main elements would
have been something that some patients would benefit
from whereas others might not. Once more we would
arrive at the conclusion that an abstract, formalized doctrine of informed consent cannot meet the needs of each
patient, something that bioethicists have been saying for
some time.
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The critics are therefore correct that healthcare
workers should carefully consider which information
patients receive during the informed consent process.
There also seems to be no denying that the process must
establish relationships that will serve everyone’s interests.
To the extent that bioethics commentary would seek to
formulate or examine rules that guide such interaction, it
is subject to scrutiny. But there are arguments in the
literature that advocate doing away with traditional conceptions of informed consent altogether, for instance,
and replacing it with a highly individualized model that
reflects the interests of healthcare workers, patients, and
their families.33 There are also proposals by bioethicists to
supplement informed consent with contextualization or
narrative reports.34 Greater familiarity with the literature
in bioethics, and the range of opinions there, might have
revealed to critics that the general range of questions that
they would have bioethicists ask are already part of the
dialogue about informed consent. This doesn’t mean that
those opinions necessarily have truth on their side. Nevertheless, it seems irresponsible to argue as if these viewpoints don’t exist, while placing one or two comments
gleaned from the pages of a social-science journal at the
head of the line as though such remarks are authoritative.
Is it possible to conduct the comparison of methods or
approaches fairly? On one hand, it is tempting to think
that all we have to do is locate a few discussions of a
topic, informed consent will do, and show where there are
significant differences in the way that bioethicists and
social scientists address it. A second step in the comparison, which seems equally intuitive, would be to test the
conclusions against what happens in the clinic. This latter
stage seems to be what some critics have in mind. On the
other hand, what would this really prove? It seems likely
that we would learn that topics such as informed consent
are not easy to pin down or to place squarely within one
discipline. That conclusion isn’t likely to surprise many
bioethicists or social scientists. We would also find, I
expect, that differences in approach are explainable
(which is not to say justified) on the basis of the difference
between description versus evaluation. Our comparison
would, in other words, show what the critics have done a
good job at revealing: bioethicists are guilty of not trying
to be social scientists, and vice-versa.
What undermines the calls for reform is that critics
have not shown that the bioethicists should make the
transition or that patients and others would necessarily
33

See, e.g. R.M. Veatch. Abandoning Informed Consent. Hastings
Center Report 1995; 25: 5–12.
34
J. Song, E.R. Ratner, D.M. Bartels. Dying While Homeless: Is it a
Concern when Life itself is Such a Struggle? Journal of Clinical Ethics
2005; 16: 251–261.

benefit if they did. Where we might naturally ask for
reasons why the empirically oriented interpretation
should carry the day, critics produce only very general
remarks about the superiority of the descriptive
approach. This would be more impressive if the critics
were also able to show that the descriptive approach is of
much use when we want to do something other than
describe a situation. To make matters worse, the critics
do not seem averse to smuggling in normative judgments
about what informed consent should involve. Since the
ability to make such judgments is at the heart of the
criticism of bioethics, this is bound to leave bioethicists
scratching their heads, wondering why critics seem so
uninterested in meeting them on the usual terms of scholarly debate.

IV. TOWARDS MEANINGFUL REFORM
This last point is worth elaborating upon, since it gets
at what critics seem to think is an underlying tension
between bioethics and the social sciences. The lack of
consensus on what should constitute informed consent
might show that the question is not whether bioethicists
can gain from the empirical approach, but how anyone
can know which details an argument should include. The
empirical approach to gathering information can result in
subjective and often highly personalized impressions of
cultures that ethnographers observe.35 The phenomena
that qualitative social scientists observe are shifting, with
situations lasting only a few moments. This means that an
ethnographer wanting to verify that a fellow researcher
has gotten things right has few reliable ways to reconstruct the situation that was observed. Ethical guidelines
add a further complication, as they in many cases restrict
the scientists from being too detailed when they describe
actual people and their lives. The guidelines will also
prevent subsequent researchers from proving that an
ethnographer hasn’t merely embellished details or made
them up entirely.
Where this leaves the need or prospect for reform is
hard to say. Possibly because the norm has for some time
been to take a very broad swipe at the discipline, there is
a certain ease in contending that greater attention to
empirical details will lead to ‘a bioethics that is more
attuned to the particular and more sensitive to the
35
Bosk (2000) also provides very useful reflections on the interdisciplinary prospects of bioethics and social science. Bosk, C. The
Sociological Imagination and Bioethics. In Handbook of Medical Sociology, pp. 223–241. Edited by Bird, C.E., and Conrad, P., 223–241,
Englewood, NJ Prentice-Hall, 2000.
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personal, a bioethics that is more humane and more
helpful’ (Hoffmaster 2001, 2). But it would be irresponsible to assume that we can leave empirical researchers to
define ‘the personal’ or the ‘humane’ unless a way is
found to distinguish between findings that should move
people to act or think differently, and findings which are
merely interesting. Another way to put this would be to
say that bioethicists will not reform their discipline by
arguing for a moral point on the basis of a snapshot of
context. Making normative claims on the strength of
shaky evidence and dubious interpretations is something
that they are accused of doing too much of already.
At the same time, reservations about going empirical
cannot be brushed aside as simple turf-consciousness or
naivete on the part of bioethicists. Some bioethicists who
rely on social science methods express their own doubts
about a straightforward integration of fieldwork and bioethics.36 In his reflections on the drawbacks of the empirical approach, Bosk raises troubling questions about the
negotiation that preceded the publication of his ethnography of healthcare workers. Bosk explains how he was
forced to alter certain details and fictionalize names and
locations before his work went public, knowing that this
would mean that the resulting truth would be a compromise between research goals and ethical considerations.
Bosk’s point reinforces the notion that, however appealing it might be to think that the reform of bioethics will be
as simple as parceling out factual claims to social scientists, and making sure that bioethics arguments rest on
solid facts, there is for now no easy way to know how
facts should be used in an argument, or whether some
purported facts should be used at all.37
Someone might object that my caution towards accepting second-hand (or even first-hand) observations from
social scientists should extend towards analysis, principlism, and what Hoffmaster calls ‘armchair speculation.’
But there is no reason to think that any method or
approach is worthy of blind acceptance, or is a necessary
part of the reasoning that goes into a bioethics argument.
A thought experiment will sometimes miss the point of
the bioethics dilemma that it is applied to. The thought
experiment might require an intuitive leap that seems at
odds with what someone might claim is true of real-world
36
C. Bosk. Irony, Ethnography, and Informed Consent In: Hoffmaster
B, ed. Bioethics in Social Context. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2001; 199–227.
37
Zussman (2000) and others worry that bioethicists will only then
make social scientists ‘junior partners,’ that is, asking them to do little
more than ‘fact-checking’ (10; see also Hedgecoe, 2004). This worry
might be unnecessary. Anyone who suggests that only trivial work
would be involved or needed when testing empirical claims is greatly
over-simplifying the picture.
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conditions. Should the thought experiment fail when
tested against competing positions or additional evidence
from the field, however, this would not negate the overall
process. It would, rather, confirm the idea that a rhetorical device like a thought experiment deserves a role in a
particular argument only until someone provides a promising alternative. Interpretations of empirical details are
best held to the same scrutiny, with a thought experiment
being useful for teasing out the implications of accepting
that interpretation. Ideally, because topics like informed
consent have many empirical and theoretical aspects,
a model of bioethical reasoning would leave room for
commentators to vary the amount of empirical and
non-empirical apparatus that they think is necessary.
Decisions about the construction of arguments would
then be driven by a number of factors, including (but not
limited to) accuracy, reliability, aesthetic considerations,
and logic. Giving commentators this latitude would be
consistent with the idea that to criticize an argument or a
method in bioethics is to do bioethics, not attack it from
beyond the discipline.

V. CLOSING THOUGHTS
A meaningful alternative is something that critics have so
far not provided in their advocacy of an approach based
on the social sciences. In their interpretations of broad
trends in bioethics, critics have shown only that the social
science approach would lead to a different discipline, not
necessarily a better one. This is partly because critics seem
to begin with a misleading portrayal of bioethics. There is
no reason to speak as if there should be an over-riding
purpose or motivation shared by everyone in the fields
that coalesce as bioethics. More productive would be a
way to refine the ability to form and test arguments, using
what one hopes would be a common language and set of
interests.
The second general problem with what critics have to
offer is that reform cannot be as simple as showing how
much more detailed a particular ethnography can be than
an analytical thought experiment. This is something that
few bioethicists might take issue with. The controversy
arises over how empirically robust a bioethics discussion
can be and still function as a normative argument.
Empirical claims are relevant only to the extent that they
are reliable or accurate, and bear on the ethical issue
being argued. The same could be said of thought experiments or perspectives that emphasize moral principles, of
course. But the decision to incorporate factual details or
appeal to moral principles must be judged according to
the strength of the argument itself and the presumed goal.
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And since thought experiments and details from an ethnography usually do not serve the same function in an
argument, trying to say which one should be given priority will be more complicated than simply showing which
one is ‘closer’ to what a particular patient might be going
through.
Finally, urging bioethicists to adopt methods and data
from the social sciences can be seen as a recommendation
that falls squarely within the tradition of the field that is
under scrutiny. Where ideas are exchanged through a
system that relies on blind peer-review, it is not very
convincing to argue that social scientists are excluded
from discussions of bioethics topics. Nor does it makes
sense to claim that there are no outlets for discussions
that lean heavily towards the empirical approach.

Empirical and philosophical aspects intertwine in many
of the arguments that bioethicists make, and reform of
bioethics might come by way of commentators offering
convincing counter-arguments to positions found in the
literature. Suggesting that efforts towards reforming bioethics might be redirected towards simply contributing
and critiquing the commentary on various bioethics
topics is in the end not asking for much. But such participation by the critics of bioethics would mark an
improvement over their caricatures of the discipline, and
their warnings about its impending irrelevance.
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